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ABSTRACT
THE SIGNALLING OF MANAGEMENT ABOUT THEIR COMPANIES' 
PERFORMANCE THROUGH BONUS ISSUES
TARKAN GUYUK 
M.B.A. THESIS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY - ANKARA 
JULY 1998
Supervisor: Dr. Aslihan Altay-Salih
The present thesis aims at investigating the validity of information signaling 
hypothesis through bonus issues in Turkey. The study looks at all the bonus issues by 
industrial companies realized during 1995-1997 period. It uses event study 
methodology to search for the positive average abnormal returns and the correlation 
of those with the real changes in yearly Net Sales ("NS"), Earnings Per Share ("EPS") 
and Earnings Per Price ("EPP") figures of the selected companies within 30 days 
before and after the bonus issue. The results support the positive abnormal return and 
abnormal volume increase before the split execution date, however no significant 
correlation between average abnormal returns and the selected indicators could be 
detected. This finding is contrary to the information-signaling hypothesis through 
bonus issues.
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Price
ÖZET
YÖNETİCİLERİN BEDELSİZ SERMAYE ARTIRIMI YOLU İLE 
ŞİRKETLERİNİN PERFORMANSI HAKKINDA PİYASAYA SİNYAL
VERMELERİ
TARKAN GÜYÜK 
M.B.A. TEZİ
BİLKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ - ANKARA 
TEMMUZ 1998
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Aslıhan Altay-Salih
Bu tez çalışmasının amacı, Türkiye'de sinyal hipotezine bağlı olarak bilginin bedelsiz 
hisse bölünmesi yolu ile iletibildiği varsayımının araştırılmasıdır. Çalışma, 1995-1997 
dönemi içindeki sanayi şirketlerine ait tüm bedelsiz sermaye artırımlarını inceler. 
Örnekleme Analizi yöntemi ile yapılan çalışma hisselerin bölünme tarihinden 30 gün 
öncesi ve sonrasına kadar ki süre içerisinde normalin üzerindeki pozitif getiriler ile 
şirketlerin bölünme yılı başındaki ve sonundaki Net Satış ("NS"), Hisse Başı Kazanç 
("HBK") ve Kazanç Başı Fiyat ("KBF") rakamları arasındaki korelasyona 
bakmaktadır. Çalışma sonuçları, bölünme öncesindeki günlerde ortalama normalin 
üzerindeki pozitif getirileri desteklerken, bu getiriler ile seçilen fınansal göstergeler 
arasında bir ilgi olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu bulgu, sinyal hipotezine bağlı olarak 
bilginin bedelsiz hisse bölünmesi yolu ile iletibildiği varsayımı ile çelişmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hisse Bölünmesi, Bedelsiz Sermaye Artırımı, Net Satışlar, Hisse 
Başı Kazanç, Kazanç Başı Fiyat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................................. 2
ÖZET......................................................................................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................................4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................................5
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................................... 6
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................7
II. LITERATURE SURVEY................................................................................................................. 12
III. CAPITAL INCREASES................................................................................................................. 18
III. 1. BONUS SHARES AND PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS..................................................................18
III. 2. MECHANISM OF CAPITAL INCREASES......................................................................... 19
111.2. I. Principal Capital System........................................................................................................ 19
111.2. 2. Authorized Capital System.......................................................................................................20
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................22
IV. A. DATA.....................................................................................................................................22
IV.B. METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................24
V. RESULTS........................................................................................................................................... 29
VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................ 38
VII. REFERENCES............................................................................................................................... 41
VIII. APPENDIX.................................................................................................................................... 43
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I must express my appreciation to the many colleagues and collaborators who 
contributed to research, data collection and the development of the ideas in this study. 
But at the very first hand, I owe special thanks to my supervisor Ms. Aslihan Salih for 
continually challenging me to improve and refine and extend my thinking. I should 
express my gratitude to Mr. Ali Seyhun, research director of my company for his 
assistance in developing ideas, and Mr. Nejat Seyhun, director of department of 
Finance in University of Michigan for his support in literature survey, and Mr. Burak 
Tugan, for his invaluable help in data collection and data management for this event 
study. I owe special debt to Mr. Mehmet Sami, senior vice president of my company 
and my business supervisor for his patience throughout the study. And I owe more 
than I express to my friend Şule Gökşenli for her assistance in research and patience 
and encouragement.
LIST OF TABLES
Table V.l. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics by years
Table V.2. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics for volume group
Table V.3. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics for split factor group
Table V.4. Regression Analysis - All data set
Table V.5. Regression Analysis - Volume group
Table V.6. Regression Analysis - Split factor group
Table V.7. ARAV (-30/30) and t statistics by years
I. INTRODUCTION
Stock splits remain one of the most popular academic research areas in equity 
markets. Researchers have puzzled about the impact of stock splits and stock 
dividends for long time. Since the stock dividends and stock splits lead to an increase 
in the number of shares of the company, they have no impact on percent of 
shareholder ownership in their company. There have been several empirical studies 
conducted to understand the basics behind the stock price changes during stock splits. 
Since, it is a fact that stock splits and stock dividends are no more than cosmetic 
changes and have no real affect on the value of the company, the interest of investors 
to splitted shares and companies' engagement in that financial manipulation are the 
basic questions.
Although a bonus issue should be viewed as nothing more than a stock split, likewise 
their foreign counterparts, the investors in the Turkish stocks market have been 
observed to reward such stocks in a surprising way for reasons that have not been 
fully understood. This study is conducted to shed some light on this anomaly from 
Turkish Stock Market point of view.
As details can be comprehended at Literature Survey section of this study, 
researchers generally reveal the stock splits in three different h)q5otheses. One 
hypothesis claims that the ultimate goal of stock splits is to bring the stock to an 
optimal trading range to attract additional investors with relatively low economic 
conditions. Another explanation stresses on signaling hypotheses, which claims that 
the management conveys favorable and previously unknown information to market 
via stock splits. The last common theory, on the other hand, asserts that stock splits 
are used by managers to attract the investors and to make them re-assess the value of 
their companies.
According to trading range hypothesis, stock splits are occasionally used by 
corporations that want to broaden the market for their shares. Splitting shares may 
enlarge the potential shareholder group to include investors who do not have large 
amounts to invest. This may also have reverse effects. Knowladgeable professionals 
will probably use the oversized split as an opportunity to sell in to the obvious "good 
news" and excitement, and take their profits. Additionally, stocksplits create a 
substantially larger supply and may put a company in a sluggish performance, or "big 
cap" status sooner which might lower the interest to the company's shares especially 
in speculative markets like Istanbul Stock Exchange ("ISE").
Another objection for price range approach is that large holders who are thinking of 
selling might feel it easier to sell some of their shares before the split takes effect than 
to sell increased number of shares after the split. The institutional investors would end 
up with a dramatically large number of shares to sell after an unreasonable stock split.
Signaling hypothesis relies on the traditional understanding that the stock splits are 
good news for investors. The companies split their stocks when they are confident that 
earnings growth will continue and accordingly the stock price will move upward. A 
stock split announcement will trigger the reassesments of the company's future cash 
flows by market analysts. It is obvious that such an approach is of interest to 
undervalued companies rather than overvalued ones.
Although stock splits usually have no obvious effects on investment values or investor 
returns, unusual price changes near the time of splits generally result from rational 
investor reactions to changes in the corporations earning power rather than from the 
split. In an efficient market, investors would adjust for the forthcoming stock split 
prior to the announcement, because any relevant information that caused the split has 
already been discounted. It is argued that the stock price increase that leads a 
company to split its stock is caused by increases in earnings or other important 
successes. Accordingly, these bits of information are known and adjusted prior to the 
split announcement.
However, it could be argued that a split may provide a negative signal that 
management feels that its stock price has peaked. Additionally, some may find the 
splits' necessity is unclear since alternative signaling devices (such as dividend 
increases) are cheaper to implement. Moreover emprical research has declared several 
negative effects such as increase in transaction cost, false signaling cost, increased 
volatility following splits. Therefore, it remains a puzzle why companies split their 
shares (O'Hara et.all.,1998)
In Turkey, the companies may increase their capital only through the issuance of new 
shares, and such issuance may be in the form of a rights issue or a bonus issue. 
Holders of shares are entitled to subscribe for new shares ("pre-emption rights") in 
proportion to their respective share holdings each time the company undertakes a 
capital increase. Bonus issues may be undertaken in order to convert all or a portion 
of the revaluation fund and reserves of a company, distributable profits and profits 
from the sale of equity participations and fixed assets into share capital.
This study mainly concentrates on the perception and reaction of investors to bonus 
issues by the managers who are supposedly intending to convey favorable and 
previously privately known information to the market. The data set is composed of 
the bonus issues of ISE listed companies in Turkey between 1995-1997. The period 
beginning with 1995 is perceived as the more efficient period due to electronic trading 
system and considerably effective dissemination of information. This same period 
also excludes the 1994 financial crises which had significant impact on the companies' 
financial performance. The given period includes 97 stocks with 166 events. Financial 
companies are excluded from the sample set due to different balance sheet 
charactersitics and income structure.
The study mainly focuses on three points. Firstly, using the event study methodology, 
it explores the price reactions in the market during the course of 30 days before and 
after the split. The findings indicate that there exist statistically significant abnormal 
returns beginning from 10 days before the split. Following the execution of the split 
no significant abnormal returns have been detected.
Secondly, the study examines the relationship between average abnormal return 
around split days and selected financial indicators namely, real growth in yearly Net 
Sales ("NS" hereafter), annual change (%) in Earnings per Shares ("EPS" hereafter) 
and again annual change (%) in Earnings per Price ("EPP" hereafter) ratios. If 
signaling hypothesis is right, the companies with significant return during split days 
are expected to yield a positive real increase in their NSs and/or certain positive 
changes in EPS and EPP ratios. To be able to seek for the relation between average 
abnormal returns and the changes in the indicators, sample sets are formed in three 
different ways. First, all of the companies realizing bonus issues in 1995-97 period are 
taken as one sample group. Second, the companies having bonus issues in 1995-97 
but average trading volumes of above 7 million shares (each representing the 0.2% of 
total ISE trading volume for benchmarking purposes) between 01/01/1997 and 
31/12/1997 are taken as another sample group. Finally, the companies with a split 
factor of 1+, 2+, 3 and above are taken as the third sample group. The correlation 
between abnormal returns and selected indicators are searched for the same 
companies using three different sample groups. Among those groups, t statistics gives 
relatively significant results only for the first sample group. However the value is 
far below for all sample sets to explain a significant relation between dependent and 
independent variables which are selected indicators and average abnormal returns 
respectively. Our findings could not detect a relation between the financial 
performance of the companies and their abnormal return during split period. This 
raises the questions about the validity of signalling hypothesis in Turkish Capital 
Markets.
Lastly, the study discusses the trading volume changes in 30 days before and after the 
split date. To calculate the abnormal changes in the trading volume, the average 
historic trading volume of companies and ISE-100 are computed using associated data 
in 90 days starting from 120 days prior to the bonus issue. The results point out a 
significant change in the trading volumes of stocks picking up during 10 days period 
before bonus issue.
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The study is organized as follows; the following section covers the literature on stock 
splits. In section 3, the capital increase mechanism, stages of decision and 
implementation in Turkey are explained briefly. Section 4 presents the methodology 
of the study, the data collection and data handling procedures are also discussed in 
detail. The results of the study are given in section 5. The last section is devoted to 
conclusions and future research ideas.
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II. LITERATURE SURVEY
A number of explanations for stock splits have been proposed in the literature. The 
trading range hypothesis and signaling hypothesis are the most popüler ones. Trading 
range hypothesis, (Maloney et.alL, 1992 or Muscarella at.all., 1996), argues that the 
firms prefer to keep their stock price within a particular price range as uninformed 
traders prefer to trade the stock at the lower price rather than the higher price. 
Signaling hypothesis (Brennan and Copeland,1988 or Brennan and Hughes, 1991), on 
the other hand, asserts that splits reduce informational asymmetries either by directly 
signaling good news which are previously privately known or by simply attracting the 
investors to the company. Another popular explanation comes from Angel (1997), 
who claims that the splits bring about an increase in liquidity which improve the 
overall execution of the stock
One of the most popular studies addressing the above issues is presented by 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) who investigate empirically why firms split their stock 
and distribute stock dividends and why the market reacts favorably to these 
distributions. They classify their hypotheses in two groups: signaling and optimal 
pricing. As far as the signaling hypothesis is concerned, they propose that for a 
signaling tool to be valid there should be a cost associated with sending false signals. 
There should be a cost incurred for companies with below average expected 
performance to imitate the signaling decisions of those companies with above average 
performance. For optimal trading range hypothesis, they suggest that stock splits will 
attract small size investors and lead to an increase in volume. Since the wealthy 
investors will be penalized due to brokerage costs arising from fixed per share 
transaction cost component, there must be an optimal range that equilibrates the 
preferences of those different class of investor.
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To conduct their study, Lev et al. drive the data from University of Chicago's CRSP 
tape, the Merged Annual Compustat tape, and the Compustat Prices-Dividends- 
Eamings (PDE) monthly tape. The data sample consists of 1,015 stock split events 
and 1,257 stock dividend events. In addition to test sample, a control sample is 
constructed by matching every company that had a stock split or a stock dividend 
announcement with a company from the same four digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry code with an asset size as close as possible to the test 
company. Their analysis is primarily based on comparing the test and control samples. 
To test signaling hypothesis, they analyze the behavior of two major indicators of 
corporate performance: growth in earnings and in cash dividends. Growth is measured 
as the percent change in the value of earnings or dividends in the last quarter of an 
examined period relative to the corresponding values at the beginning of period 
quarter. Lev et al. uses E/P ratio (earnings per share divided by price) for the test 
sample since the E/P ratio reflects the markets expectations about the future growth of 
earnings. Their findings suggest that stock splits are mainly aimed at restoring stock 
prices to a "normal trading range". The price correction motive seems more strongly 
supported by the data than by the signaling motive.
Brennan and Copeland (1988), perform an empirical work and develop a model of 
stock split behavior in which the split serves as a costly signal of managers' private 
information because stock trading costs depend on stock prices. Both administrative 
costs including printing, legal and other administrative expenses and costs due to 
possessing odd lots are the main sources of costs arising from splits. The study's 
results provide strong empirical support that a stock split provides a useful signal to 
investors about managers' private information. Their second finding also contradicting 
with Lakonishok and Lev's study (1987) is that stock splits on average do not bring 
the price back to the average of a control sample of nonsplitting stocks.
Another study contradicting with Lev's findings about signaling is reported by 
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996). Ikenberry et al. focus on a single distribution 
size and two for one splits are selected because they are the most common. The 
sample is composed of all NYSE and ASE firms that declared two for one splits 
between 1975 and 1990. The test sample consists of 1,275 two for one splits. They
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observe significant post-split excess returns both in the first year and the first three 
years. Their observations support the fact that since the managers can obtain relevant 
information about the future of their company, they declare stock splits to convey 
favorable information about the current and future value of the company. The other 
result of their study is on trading ranges. The study indicates that splits generally 
occur when stocks trade at high prices. Splits realign share prices to lower trading 
levels, but managers condition their decision to split on their expectations of the 
company's future performance.
Similarly, McNichols and Dravid (1990) study on the correlation between 
management's choice of split factor and private information conveyed about the future 
earnings. Their sample is comprised of 3,015 observations drawn from CRSP Daily 
Master Tape for the period of 1967-1975. They perform three different tests. The first 
test is on the choice of split factor reflecting management's private information about 
future earnings. Second test examines the association between announcement returns 
and split factor signal. The third test focuses on the relation between the revision of 
investors' beliefs about the value of the firm and the firm's future earnings. The first 
test concludes that firms incorporate their private information about future earnings in 
choosing their split factor. After the second test, they find a strong statistical relation 
between announcement returns and split factor signals, suggesting that investors' 
inferences about firms value correspond to firms' split factor choices. The third test 
presents one of the most important outcomes of the study that investors revise their 
beliefs about the company value according to the split factor. However, the error 
factor in forecasting future earnings indicates that split factors signal other valuation 
relevant attributes and should not be considered to be correlated with the future 
earnings. Their findings also strongly support trading range approach of Lakonishok 
and Lev (1987).
Brennan and Copeland (1988) look at the same split factor issue and they suggest that 
companies do not split by a factor larger than is warranted by their stock price and 
private information. Disregarding the transactional costs due to an increase in number 
of shares following a share split, managers' increasing expectation on the future 
earnings of their company is correlated with the split factor.
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Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) analyze the valuation effects of stock split and 
stock dividend announcements. They collect the initial announcements of proposed 
splits and stock dividends for the years 1967-1976 from two sources: the Wall Street 
Journal Index and CRSP Daily Master Tape. The sample set includes 1,761 events. 
The result indicates that on average, there is a significant increase in a firm's stock 
price at the stock split announcement. This increase may be partially due to forecasts 
of impending increase in cash dividends. The further analysis suggests that some of 
the information content of stock distribution appears to be directly associated with 
companies' future cash flows since some of the companies that paid no dividends in 
the three years prior to the announcement display similar price behavior.
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) explain the abnormal return after the announcement of a 
large split in the context of "tax option model". They gather 217 events from CRSP 
tape for the period of July 1962 to December 1985. Three for one splits comprise 
sixty eight percent of the splitting sample. Poon et al. suggest that security volatility is 
desirable, given the nature of the U.S. tax code. In particular, long-term capital gains 
are preferred and short-term capital losses may be used to offset short-term gains. A 
stock with a price that fluctuates beyond an expected range presents its holder an 
opportunity to realize losses short term or gains long term to re-establish short term 
status. Therefore, it is suggested that the investors are willing to pay for a "tax option" 
component of a stock. Thus, stocks with higher volatilities will have higher values. 
According to their paper, following the announcement of a split, the daily number of 
transactions along with the raw volume of shares traded will increase. This increase in 
volume results in an increase in the noisiness of the security's return process. The 
increase in noise raises the tax option value of the stock and it is this value that 
generates the armouncement effect of stock splits. This theory implies a significant 
increase in the number of shareholders and trading volume around the announcement 
of a split and this occurs in spite of the reduction of liquidity.
The decrease in liquidity following the stock splits is evidenced by the paper 
published by Defeo and Jain (Forthcoming). This is inline with the suggestions given 
by Lamoureux and Poon (1987) but against the 98% of sample chief financial officers
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indicating that their stock split enhanced the liquidity of their companies shares 
(Baker and Gallagher, 1980).
In another study Easly, O'Hara and Saar (1998) examined how splits affect the 
liquidity of a stock by providing explicit estimates of the rates of uninformed and 
informed trading. Their basic sample is all NYSE common stocks that had two for one 
splits in 1995. Hence the sample used in their empirical work consists of 72 stocks. 
Given the above data, they use algorithms (The Lee and Ready Algorithm and The 
Limit Order Algorithm) to measure the post split trade process after the split is carried 
out. Then they investigate the effect of splits on a stock's informational asymmetry by 
calculating the probability of information based trading both before and after a split. 
They conclude that the trading cost rise for uninformed traders, which will lead to an 
adverse effect on the liquidity of the stock. This result is inconsistent with the optimal 
tick size hypothesis by Angel (1997) who claims that the increase in spreads typically 
accompanying a split induces greater participation by liquidity providers (traders) and 
this increased liquidity enhances the overall execution of the stock.
Another different approach comes from Muradoglu and Aydogan (1998). They 
investigate the learning process and alternative reasons for market reactions at the 
emerging markets of continuously changing structure and market participants in the 
light of Turkish Stock Market. This study, the only analysis on stock splits behaviors 
in Turkey, investigate price changes subject to announcement and execution of rights 
issues and stock dividends by examining three different developmental levels of the 
Turkish Stock Market. They obtain data from Capital Market Board of Turkey. Their 
sample data consists of 73 events (40 firms) from 1988-89 period, 243 events (113 
firms) from 1990-92 period, 196 events (119 firms) from 1993-94 period.
The study mainly concentrates on the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns of 
stocks in a ±30 days event window where t=0 is the split day. The results indicate that 
as the market matures, the dependence of price reactions to board decisions becomes 
inconsistent. They also focus on whether the price reactions around the execution of 
rights issues are originating from the possible change in investor mix in the ISE.
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Additionally, the study investigates the existence of increase in trading volumes 
associated with stock splits as the investor mix enriches with the new entrance of 
small investors to ISE. Furthermore, this paper argues the possible impact of prior 
knowledge on excess returns during execution of rights issues.
They find significant abnormal returns for the third period, 1993-1994. The reason for 
not detecting abnormal return for the initial periods is explained as the thin trading. 
Significant and persistent abnormal return for the entire 1988-1994 period is mainly 
due to the abnormal performance during the 3'^ '' period. These abnormal return and 
price reactions are explained by the change in the investor mix in the ISE from 
institutional to individual investors which lead an improvement in quality and quantity 
of financial information during this period. This conclusion is supported with the fact 
that there has been an increase in the quantity and quality of interim reports released 
by Turkish companies during 1993-1994 period.
This thesis mainly covers the studies of Aydogan and Muradoglu to a certain extent 
for the period of 1995-1997 and adds its significant contribution by examining the 
signaling process in Turkish Stock Market. Using 166 events by 97 companies during 
1995-97 period, we run regression analysis between average abnormal returns and 
selected financial indicators addressing growth in the sample companies. 
Additionally, the significance of price changes during the pre-split period and 
abnormal volume changes during the same period are examined to understand market 
perception of stock splits. The results display that there has been a value increase 
during the pre-split period. However, there is no proof that the mentioned growth in 
value is related to favorable information (growth in earnings) about the company. 
However, the significant average abnormal return and average abnormal volume 
changes during pre-split period demonstrate the interest of Turkish investors towards 
stock splits independent of the companies' growth prospects.
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III. CAPITAL INCREASES 
III.l. BONUS SHARES AND PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS
Turkish companies may increase their capital only through the issuance of new shares, 
and such issuance may be in the form of a rights issue or a bonus issue. Holders of 
shares are entitled to subscribe for new shares ("pre-emption rights") in proportion to 
their respective share holdings each time the company undertakes a capital increase. 
The boards of directors of Turkish companies generally recommend that new shares 
be issued at prices equal to their nominal value, which entitles the existing 
shareholders to subscribe for shares at a significant discount from their current market 
price. The exercise of pre-emption rights by shareholders must be made within a 
subscription period announced by the company, which may not be less then 15 days 
or more than 60 days. Shareholders of a listed company who do not wish to subscribe 
for new shares may sell their rights on the ISE. Any shares not subscribed by the 
existing shareholders or purchasers of the rights coupons are sold on the ISE at the 
current market price. Any differences between the rights issue price and price realized 
for the shares on the ISE accrues to the surplus account of the company. The Capital 
Market Board ("CMB" hereafter) requires that the right of the board of directors to 
restrict the pre-emption rights of shareholders apply equally with respect to all 
shareholders.
Under Turkish Law, bonus issues may be undertaken in order to convert all or a 
portion of the revaluation fund and reserves of a company, distributable profits and 
profits from the sale of equity participations and fixed assets into share capital. 
Shareholders' rights to receive bonus shares may not be restricted.
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The issuing company declares the date of exercising bonus shares, together with the 
rate of increase, the capital increase date and other relevant information. Those 
information is published at the daily ISE bulletin.
In case the issuing company gives receipts representing the new issues, receipts are 
replaced with the genuine securities within 30 days for bearer securities, 90 days for 
the registered ones.
III.2. MECHANISM OF CAPITAL INCREASES
In Turkey, there are two different capital systems that are governed by both Turkish 
Commercial Code and Capital Market Law. Both systems have their own mechanisms 
in application.
III.2 .1. Principal Capital System
Capital increases of corporations subject to the principal capital system are initiated 
upon the proposal of the Board of Directors to the General Assembly. The General 
Assembly resolves to raise the capital after the CMB approves the draft incorporating 
amendments pertaining to the capital increase in the Articles of Incorporation. 
Following the decision of the General Assembly, the same procedures specified for 
corporations, which have adopted the authorized capital system, are implemented. The 
amount to be paid for exercising preemptive rights are collected in a blockaged bank 
account of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. (Except for the State Economic 
Enterprises (“SEE”)). In case of bonus capital increase, bonus shares are distributed to 
shareholders after registration with the CMB, without the need for an announcement 
via a circular. Corporations subject to the principal capital system submit provisional 
receipts (non-transferable) to its shareholders in place of new shares. These 
provisional receipts are replaced by new shares upon the registration of the capital 
increase in the Trade Registry, approval of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and 
removal of the blockage. Shareholders of bearer certificates are entitled to receive
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new stocks within 30 days while those holders of registered certificates will receive 
new shares within 90 days following the registration to the Trade Registry. Within 6 
workdays after the end of the sale an application is made to the CMB for approval. 
The CMB approves the amount of shares obtained by exercising the preemptive 
rights. At this stage the shareholders obtaining 10% or more of the raised capital are 
announced.
IIL2. 2, Authorized Capital System
Contrary to the principal system, the Board of Directors of corporations subject to the 
authorized capital system is vested with more power. For corporations subject to the 
authorized capital system, the capital increase process starts with the resolution of the 
Board of Directors. Following the decision of the Board of Directors, the corporation 
applies to the Capital Markets Board (CMB) for registration of its capital increase.
Subsequently, a prospectus concerning the public offering approved by the CMB is 
registered and announced within 15 days following the registration of the capital 
increase. The circular pertaining to the new shares is also announced within 15 days 
after the registration of the prospectus.
Subscription for the exercise of the preemptive rights can be done either in the 
headquarters of the corporation or in a brokerage firm. In case of a public corporation 
the subscription for exercising the preemptive rights shall be in 3 easily reachable 
centers and in Takasbank. The subscription period for exercising preemptive rights is 
between 15-60 days. The amount to be paid for exercising preemptive rights is 
collected in a special bank account of the corporation.
Within 15 days after the termination of the subscription period, a circular is 
announced regarding the unexercized portion of right issues. If the last day is not a 
workday, then the first workday becomes the termination of the subscription period. 
At this stage, the period is not specified for the sale of unexercized portion of rights.
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In the case of bonus capital increases, bonus shares are distributed to shareholders 
after registration with the CMB, without the need for an announcement via a circular.
Shareholders of entities subject to authorized capital system are entitled to new shares 
upon the submission of capital increase coupons within the subscription period. 
Within 6 workdays after the end of the sale an application is made to the CMB for 
approval. The CMB approves the amount of shares obtained by exercising the 
preemptive rights. At this stage the shareholders obtaining 10% or more of the raised 
capital are announced. Within 10 days the Corporation applies to the Trade Registry 
for registration of the CMB approval.
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
IV.A. DATA
This study uses all of the bonus issues by industrial companies between 1995 and 
1997 in Istanbul Stock Exchange ("ISE"). Considering the uncontrolled growth in 
1993 and following financial crises in 1994, the data for the underlined period is 
accepted to be the most convenient set to be analyzed for the purpose of this study. 
Additionally the learning process concept mentioned in Aydogan and Muradoglu 
(1998) is also contemplated in initiating the data file from 1995.
The reason for concentrating on only bonus issues is that since the rights issues are 
used for strengthening the capital base of the company by issuing new shares at par 
value (TL 1,000 in most cases), some of the investors might be reluctant to use their 
pre-emptive rights due to cash outflow from their pockets. Although in some cases, 
the right issues are simultaneously followed by a declaration of cash dividend which 
turns the rights issue into a bonus issue, this study aims at understanding the signaling 
effects via pure bonus issues.
Another characteristics associated with the data file is that the data set composes of 
industrial companies having the same balance sheet and income statement structure. 
Financial companies, declaring different financial statements like banks or insurance 
companies are discarded due to distinctions in the formation of their income 
statements.
Given the approaches above, a total of 166 bonus issue by 97 different companies 
listed in the ISE, are contemplated. The breakdown of events and companies by years 
are tabulated below.
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Years # of Events # of Companies
1995 33 30
1996 61 61
1997 72 62
Total 166 97
Table: IV .l. # o f Events and Companies by Years
All the data for this study covering the 3 years period, is drawn from daily and 
monthly bulletins of ISE Capital Market Board and Reuters' Data Bank. The entire 
price figures for companies are adjusted according to all kinds of capital increases and 
dividend distributions. Both price and volume figures are taken for the period of 30 
days before and after the split date which is called as event window or period. The 
±30 days limit is decided due to general tendency of company boards towards 
disclosing the split date generally one month in advance. While price changes are 
processed with the ISE-100 index during the same period for each split, the volume 
changes are compared with the average volume for each event (stock) and ISE that are 
calculated as the average of 90 days trading volume prior to 30'*’ day before split date 
as sugested in Aydogan and Muradoglu (1998).
To determine the real change in Net Sales, the year-end statements before and after 
the split date are used. Those figures are turned into real values by employing the 
average of Consumer Price Index ("CPI") and Wholesales Price Index ("WPI") of the 
related years (Table: IV.2.). Again the change in the EPS and EPP ratios are computed 
using the year-ends before and after the split date
Year Wholesale Price Index (%) Consumer Price Index (%)
1995 64.9 78.9
1996 84.9 79.8
1997 91.0 99.1
Table: IV.2. WPI and CPI in 1992-1997
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The event study methodology used in calculations is taken from the study of Aydogan 
and Muradoglu (1998). The mentioned paper suggests that the abnormal return on 
stock i at day t, AR(j,t), is the difference between daily return, Rj,t, on stock i, and daily 
return on the Market Mt on day t. Hence,
IV.B. METHODOLOGY
AR(j,t) -  R(i,i) - M(t) (Eq. 1)
where daily return R(i,t) is calculated as follows;
R(i, t) = P(i,l)-P(i.(t-I))
P(i.(t-D)
(Eq. 2)
where P(i,t) is the price of stock i on day t. Mt represents the daily return of ISE-100 for 
two succesive days and can be computed similar to Equation 2;
Mt =
ISE-lOOt-ISE-lOO(t-i) 
ISE -100(1-1)
(Eq. 3)
The average abnormal return for n stocks and on day t is given as;
—  " AR(i,t)
AR(t) = E-i=i n
(Eq.4)
Considering that t = 0 is the event day, the cumulative abnormal return from ti to t2 
(say period T) can simply be calculated as;
CAR(T) = IAR(.) (Eq. 5)
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Accordingly, the t statistics for CAR(t) can be computed using the following formula;
t = CAR(T)
cr(CAR(T))
(Eq. 6)
where
cr(CAR(T)) = ct(AR(t))*Vt 2-ti + l (Eq. 7)
where cr(AR(T)) is the average variance between days ti and ii-
Besides above-mentioned analyses, volume changes during the split period should be 
observed to understand to strength of the demand for the sample stocks. In measuring 
the real trade volume change during the split period, both stock's trading volume as a 
percentage of the ISE total trading volume and stock's volume performance during a 
neutral period, Vneutrai, should be evaluated. The relative trade volume, RV(i, o, for 
stock i on day t is expressed as using trading volume, V(i, o of stock i over the market 
volume of MVt on day t such as that;
RV(i,t) = Eo.o
MV,
(Eq. 8)
Furthermore, the average relative abnormal volume for stock i on day t for the ±30 
days event period is given as;
»RAV(i,o 
ARAV(t) = Z ---------i=i n
(Eq. 9)
where:
R A V (i, 0 =  V(i, t) -  Vneulral (Eq.lO)
Vneutrai in eq.lO, stands for the average relative volume covering the 90 days before 
day t= -30.
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Linear regression is used to explore the relationship between the bonus issues and 
performance related financial variables, Net Sales, EPS and EPP. In order to observe 
the real impact of bonus issues, the abnormal returns are grouped into 10 day 
subgroups, such as, abnormal returns on t= -30 to t= -20 is one group, t= -19 to t= -10 
is another group, etc. Then the average of abnormal return for stock, i, for each group
(period) T, AR(i,T) is expressed as;
—  '^oAR(i, i) 
AR(i,T) = Z
/ 10
(Eq. 11)
Following regressions are run on the average abnormal returns;
y  = l5o+ /3iX  +  £ (Eq. 12)
where
y  = Dependent variable - Abnormal Return, ARo.t)
jc = Independent variable - The real growth in Net Sales and change in EPS and EPP 
ratios.
e = Random error component 
Po= y-intercept of the line 
P , = Slope of the line
The same regression analysis is undertaken for three different sample groups. In the 
first group, all industrial companies accomplishing bonus issue during 1995-97 period 
are taken and analyzed for each year.
Second group is selected from industrial companies whose average trading volume 
from the period of 01/01/1997 to 31/12/1997 exceed 7 million shares. This figure 
represents a 0.2% share in total ISE average trading volume during the same period. 
The mention period is selected to have unique, reliable and representative data for all 
companies having more than one event during 1995-1997.
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# of Events Data File - Sample Group I  
(By Year)
Data File - Sample Group II 
(By Volume)
1995 33 19
1996 61 33
1997 72 43
Total 166 95
Table: IV.2. # o f Events Breakdown by Year and Volume
Split Factor Data File - Sample Group III 
(%) (By Split Factor)
>= 300% 
>= 200% 
>= 100%
28
46
101
Table: IV.3. # o f Events Breakdown by Split Factor
Third sample group is formed according to the split factors that are used to examine 
the investors' attitudes towards those during stock splits. Considering the possibility 
that higher the split factor, higher the cumulative abnormal return and correlation 
between the abnormal return and the financials, the events with split factors equal and 
greater than 1 are processed. Furthermore this analysis is repeated for split factors 2, 3 
and above successively.
Since the CARm analysis points out the t= -9 to t= -1 period is the pick up period, for 
all sample groups explained above the average abnormal returns, AR(i,i) for this 
period (considering t= 0 is split day) is calculated and named as the dependent 
variables of linear regression equation. The independent variables of the equation are 
the yearly real change in the Net Sales figures and the yearly change in the EPS 
(Earning per Share) and EPP (Earning Per Price) ratios. Those figures are computed 
from the year-end financial statements of the companies. Earnings, Price and number 
of shares are as of year-ends before and after the split date. Net Sales are taken for the 
regression analysis since this figure is considered to be most difficult to manipulate 
(officially) compared to Net Earnings item eventhough year-end financials are fully
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reviewed by the independent auditors based on Capital Markets Law. Earnings per 
Share, on the other hand, is a respectful indicator for both local and foreign investors 
to assess the performance of a company in a certain period of time. Earnings per Price 
ratio (known as price multiplier) is suggested by Lev 1987 for this kind of analysis, 
since it reflects the market's expectations about the future growth of earnings.
Real growth in Net Sales is calculated as dividing % change in Net Sales by % change 
in average of CPI and WPI;
%ANS =
Net Sales y - Net Sales (y - 1) 
Net Sales (y - o
(Eq. 13)
Real change in Net Sales is:
ANS =
(1 + %ANS)
,, CPIy + WPIy,
(1 + ------- ---------)
-1 (Eq. 14)
where,
y = the year of bonus issue 
%ANS = % Change in Net Sales 
ANS = Real Growth in Net Sales
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V. RESULTS
Throughout this study, three different points are discussed to understand the motives 
and mechanisms behind the bonus issues in Turkey. Similar to international 
experiences, investors in Turkey exhibit considerable attention to splits. Accordingly, 
this is reflected as abnormal returns during the split period. This study aims at 
revealing the rationale behind the price movements during split period and exploring 
the possibility of private information signaling process from management to investors.
Initially, event study methodology is employed to explore the existence of statistically 
significant abnormal returns surrounding the split period. Graph v.l. exhibits CAR 
for 30 days before and after the bonus issue. From the figure one can see that 
cumulative abnormal returns gain an upward trend, especially 10 days prior to split 
and lead to a surge of 2.9% abnormal return on the average ("All" line indicating all 
issues during 1995-97 period in the below graph) at the split date. Following the split, 
no significant cumulative abnormal returns are detected.
Change of CAR over 60 days Event Window 
(1995-1997, %, Grouped by Years)
j -H- 1997 ♦ 1996
Graph: V .l. Change o f CAR by Years
1995 -All
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When the data file of 166 events is processed entirely and grouped for each year, the 
graph v.l. indicates the relatively strong upward tendency in cumulative abnormal
returns especially in CAR (-30/0). Graph v.l. exhibits an increasing CAR(t> just
before the split day and CAR (-30/0) makes a peak at the split day. When the bonus 
issues are analysed year by year, the very same conclusion is reached with only one
exception of 1997, when the CAR(-30/-l) value attains a peak at 1 day before the 
split day.
Change o f CAR over 60 days Event W indow  
(1995-1997, %, Grouped by Volume)
-1997 1996 1995 -All
Graph: V.2. Change o f CAR by Volume
When the same analysis is repeated for sample group II (volume group - graph v.2.) 
with 95 events out of 166 events, the results are in line with the above discussion.
During last 10 days, there is an upwards trend in CAR (-30/0) reaching a value of 
2.8% for all years data. Year based analysis for the same group supports the findings.
The very same conclusion applies to the event group formed based on split factors. 
This group represents 28, 46 and 101 events out of 166 events for split factors >300%, 
>200% and >100% respectively. The only noteworthy additional information is that
the peak value of CAR (-30/-1) reaches to around 4.3%, when the split factor is >3. 
Enlarging the data set with split factors >1, the CAR (-30/0) makes a peak at 2.9%.
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Change o f CAR over 60 days Event Window  
(1995-1997, %, Grouped by Split Factor)
->=100% ->=200% ->=300% -All
Graph: V.3. Change o f CAR by split factor
As displayed in graph v.l., the year group (= total group with 166 events) exhibits the
highest CAR value of 2.9% for -30‘'’ to 0*'’ days.
Table v.l. reports the CARs for 10 days periods in 30 days window before and after 
the split, to figure out the piek up period during bonus issue proeess. When the CAR
is computed for days t--9 to t= 0, as can be seen from table v.l., CAR (-9/0) makes a 
high of 5.76% for bonus issues in 1995 and a low of 3.38% in 1996. However for
three years analysis the CAR (-9/0) value is 4.02. During the following days the 
CARs drops down gradually.
The t statistics are reported in paranthesis such that those marked as and "**" 
stand for statistically significant at 5% and 10% respectively. The results reveal that 
only CAR(-9/0) is statistically significant at the 5% level. Another noteworthy point is 
the negative CARs following the split. Although they are statistically insignificant the 
CAR values after the split are negative.
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CAR
(-29/-20)
CAR
(-19/-10)
CAR
(-9/-0)
CAR
(1/10)
CAR
(11/20)
CAR
(21/30)
All -0.87% 
(-0.97)
1995 1.75% 
(0.89)
1996 -2.46% 
(-1.17)
1997 -0.72% 
( -0. 68)
-0.23%
(-0.43)
2.69%
(1.78)*
-0.06%
(-0.05)
-1.71%
(-2.27)**
4.02%
(4.72)**
5.76%
(3.21)**
3.38%
(3.48)**
3.75%
(2.83)**
-1.77%
(-1.26)
-3.20%
(-1.36)
-1.40%
(-0.83)
-1.44%
(-0.93)
-0.08%
(-0.09)
-0.25%
(-0.18)
-0.05%
(-0.03)
-0.03%
(-0.02)
-0.84%
(-0.67)
-0.32%
r-a/5;
-1.06%
(-0.48)
-0.88%
(-0.61)
Table: V .l. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics by Years
Table V.2. reveals second sample group. When the volume group with 95 events, are
analysed, the (-9/0) period again exhibits the highest CAR value of 3.36% for all 
three years and is statistically significant at 5% level. In 1995, the same figure for -9‘'’ 
to 0*'’ days period goes up to 4.59% and statistically significant at 10% level.
CAR
(-29/-20)
CAR
(-19/-10)
CAR
(-9/-0)
CAR
(1/10)
CAR
(11/20)
CAR
(21/30)
All -0.01% -0.54% 3.36% -1.29% 1.01% 0.27%
(-0.01) (-0.52) (2.57)** (-0.81) (0.89) (0.22)
1995 1.50% 4.26% 4.59% -2.77% -1.43% -0.06%
(0.47) (1.44)* (1.57)* (-0.93) (-0.58) (-0.02)
1996 -0.80% -1.81% 3.44% -1.36% 0.21% -0.01%
(-0.58) (-1.00) (1.71)* (-0.98) (0.12) (-0.00)
1997 -0.08% -1.69% 2.76% -0.58% 2.69% 0.64%
(-0.04) (-1.53)* (1.55)* (-0.26) (1.31) (0.38)
Table: V.2. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics for volume group
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Table V.3. reports the CAR for the third sample set which is formed by considering 
the split factor. The events with split factors of 3 or more, 2 or more and 1 or more
constitute 3 different data sets. The results indicate that CAR (-9/0) changes between 
2.90% to 4.93% which is suported by t statistics of 1.35 to 1.95 respectively.
Another interesting result is the statistically significant negative CAR(l/10)s 
following the split date. As split factor decreases, the magnitude of negative effect 
declines.
CAR
(-29/-20)
CAR
(-19/-10)
CAR
(-9/-0)
CAR
(1/10)
CAR
(11/20)
CAR
(21/30)
>=300% -2.40% 0.92% 4.93% -4.54% -0.09% -0.98%
(-1.29) (0.87) (1.95)** (-1.49)* (-0.04) (-0.59)
>=200% -1.37% -1.69% 2.90% -3.20% -0.90% 0.49%
(-0.90) (-1.14) (1.35)* (-1.48)* (-0.41) (0.30)
>=100% -1.35% -0.16% 4.44% -2.32% -0.04% -0.87%
(-0.96) (-0.23) (3.44)** (-1.37)* (-0.02) (-0.65)
Table: V.3. CAR (-30/30) and t statistics for split factor group
In the second part of the analysis, the signaling hypothesis is tested. The average 
abnormal returns between -9*'’ and 0*'’ days and selected financial indicators namely 
real growth in yearly Net Sales, yearly change (%) in Earnings per Shares and again 
yearly change (%) in Earnings per Price ratios are analysed. Existence of correlation 
between those dependent and independent variables are explored. The reason for 
selecting 10 days period just before split day and the AR(-9/0) value for regression 
analysis is due to statistically significant abnormal return findings in the above 
analysis.
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Intercept fio Coefficients j3i
0.0038 0.0036 0.0071
(3.92) (1.08)
0.0040 -0.0010 0.0001
(4.28) (0.09)
0.0045 0.0013 0.0112
(4.54) (1.36)
Real Change in Net Sales 
Change in EPS 
Change in EPP
Table: V.4. Regression Analysis - All data set
Table V.4. reports the results of the regression analysis with all data set (166 events). 
The results point out that although the t statistics are significant at 5% level for Net 
Sales, EPP and EPS indicators, the inadequacy of prevent us to interprete a strong
and reliable correlation between average abnormal returns, AR(-9/0), and selected
financial figures.
Table V.5. exhibits the results for volume based data file, the regression analysis 
between AR(-9/0) and financial indicators, results in low values which falls 
short in revealing the contribution of selected financials to average abnormal returns.
Intercept j3o Coefficients /3i R^
Real Change in Net Sales 0.0032 0.0034 0.0072
(2.89) (0.83)
Change in EPS 0.0035 -0.0013 0.0300
(3.28) (-1.68)
Change in EPP 0.0022 -0.0024 0.0284
(1.76) (-1.65)
Table: V.5. Regression Analysis - Volume group
Table V.6. reveals the regression result for the sample set grouped according to split 
factors. The results show that neither t statistics for financial indicators nor R  ^support 
the correlation between average abnormal return and the financial indicators.
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Split Factor Group, ^3 Intercept j3o Coefficients /3i R""
Real Change in Net Sales 0.0055 -0.0137 0.0782
(2.39) (-1.49)
Change in EPS 0.0045 -0.0028 0.0774
(1.98) (-1.48)
Change in EPP 0.0037 -0.0034 0.0696
(1.50) (-1.40)
Split Factor Group, ^2
Real Change in Net Sales 0.0031 -0.0104 0.0510
(2.00) (-1.54)
Change in EPS 0.0028 -0.0017 0.0428
(1.72) (-1.40)
Change in EPP 0.0025 -0.0012 0.0200
(1.46) (-0.95)
Split Factor Group,
Real Change in Net Sales 0.0045 -0.0007 0.0002
(3.10) (-0.12)
Change in EPS 0.0043 -0.0016 0.0126
(3.04) (-1.13)
Change in EPP 0.0038 -0.0012 0.0062
(2.40) (-0.78)
Table: V.6. Regression Analysis - Split factor group
When table v.6. is examined the common result is the insignificant values. Only 
for split group >3, the goes up to %8s but this again falls apart from explaining the 
relation between the indicators and the returns.
The third and the final issue is arises from the discussions of the trading volume 
changes in 30 days event window. To calculate the abnormal changes relative to the 
average historic volume level and ISE total volume, the study uses both the average 
trading volume of stock between 120 days and 30 days prior to bonus issue and ISE
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total trading volume during the 60 days event window. The results presented in graph 
V.4. indicate that during 10 days period before the split day, there is an increase in the 
trading volumes of stocks which is followed by a significant decline immediately after 
the split execution.
The magnitude of decline is much stronger for the average abnormal volume change, 
ARAV, as can be seen from graph v.4. This situation can be interpreted as a sudden 
and permanent decline in the attention of investors to splitted stocks after the 
implementation of split. After the split day, the stocks seem to lose their attractiveness 
for the investors.
Average Relative Abnormal Volume Change Over 60 days Event Window  
(1995-1997, %, Grouped by Years)
-All 1995 - -1 9 9 6 ■1997
Graph: V.4. Change in ARAV
Abnormal change in volume exhibits a strong existence during t= -9 to t= -0 period. 
When all three years are considered, the t-statistics expose a significant rise during the 
mentioned period. This result is the strongest in 1996 and the weakest in 1997 (table 
V.7.).
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ARAV ARAV ARAV ARAV ARAV ARAV
(-29/-20) (-19/-10) (-9/-0) (1/10) (11/20) (21/30)
All -0.33% 
(-0.25) 
1995 -0.97%
1996
1997
(-0.34)
-1.50%
(-0.77)
0.76%
(0.37)
-1.74%
(-1.42)*
1.72%
(0.68)
-2.25%
(-1.07)
-2.80%
(-2.76)**
3.36%
(2.03)**
5.04%
(1.36)*
4.98%
(2.04;**
1.53%
(0.66)
-2.81%
(-1.99)**
-6.76%
('-2. 02; * *
-3.36%
(-2.13)**
-0.79%
(-0.50)
1.10%
r/.oo;
-1.15%
('-o.4p;
-1.03%
r-0.54;
3.53%
r/.02;
- 1.00%  
C-0.70; 
0.22%  
CO. 07; 
-1.42% 
C-0.7P; 
- 1.20%  
C-o.oo;
Table: V.7. ARAV (-30/30) and t statistics by years
Table V.7. exhibits the same important effect revealed in table v.3. that the negative 
AJRAV(1/10) values decline throughout the years from 1995 to 1997.
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Given the hypotheses and approaches for stock splits in US markets and Turkish 
Market, a detailed event study is conducted to examine the perception of both 
investors and managers towards stock splits.
Using 166 events by 97 companies during 1995-97 period, we run regression analysis 
between average abnormal returns and selected financial indicators addressing growth 
in the sample companies. Additionally, the significance of price changes during the 
pre-split period and abnormal volume changes during the same period are examined 
to understand market perception of stock splits. The results display that there has been 
a value increase during the pre-split period. However, there is no proof that the 
mentioned growth in value is related to favorable information (growth in earnings) 
about the company. The significant average abnormal return and average abnormal 
volume changes during pre-split period demonstrate the interest of Turkish investors 
towards stock splits independent of the companies' growth prospects.
The analyses exhibit significantly positive pre-split period returns for the entire 
sample of pure bonus issues. The pick up period beginning from the 9'*’ day prior to 
split day makes a peak during the implementation day. Additionally, there is a 
significant increase in the trading volume 10 days before the split.
VI. CONCLUSION
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Associated with the findings above, when a regression analysis between the average 
abnormal return and selected financial indicators is conducted, the result demonstrates 
a negligible relation between those variables. This finding contradicts with the private 
information-signaling hypothesis. Eventhough, the split period returns enable the 
company to increase its value, this valuation change can not be explained by the 
growth in the companies' earnings. A sudden decline in the stock price, starting form 
the 1*' day after the split is an indicator of lack of a real valuation effect. Regarding to 
this analysis, the positive price movements just before the split date can be taken as 
the overreactions of the investors and can be accepted as a speculative maneuver to 
turn price adjustment expectations into lucrative returns. Since the foreign investors 
aim to invest in long terms and generally are reluctant to short term trading, the above 
mentioned speculative movements are expected to be performed by local 
investors/traders.
Furthermore, the sudden decrease in relative volume after the split similar to price, 
rises questions about the optimal trading range hypothesis in Turkey. With a 
decreasing volume and falling price, it is hard to talk about an expanding investor 
base due to affordable price range.
Due to immaturity of ISE as opposed to international markets, the consciousness level 
of average investors in ISE is still well below than those in foreign markets. Today, it 
is still possible to be in a situation in which the price difference between a stock with 
a dividend coupon on it and one without this coupon might be much higher than the 
dividend itself at the execution day. The investors (especially the local ones) are still 
making decisions based on rumors or street talks. Likewise, a significant number of 
Turkish investors are not used to comparing companies according to their market 
capitalization. Instead, they utilize only the share prices for this purpose. Within this 
context, a stock with lower price can be treated cheap compared to similar companies' 
stocks although those may have considerably low paid in capitals and accordingly low 
market value.
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A stock split decision by a listed company may be perceived by investors as the proof 
of achievement of strong earnings in the near future. In a semi-efficient market such 
information must already be incorporated in the price with the disclosure of company 
financial data. Although the Turkish Stock Market is assumed to be semi-efficient, we 
suspect that the investors question the reliability of company financials in such a high 
inflationary economy like Turkey's. Therefore we believe that investors may require 
additional proof from the company, besides financial statements, possibly in the form 
of a corporate action such as dividend and/or capital increase. Given the recorded low 
level of net dividends paid by Turkish companies, announcement of capital increase is 
perceived as an indicator of achievement. This is true even if the capital increase is 
nothing more than an accounting manipulation and causes no real change in the value 
of the company.
In conclusion, stock splits in Turkey are utilized more as a speculative tool that has 
little financial reliability instead of serving for increase in liquidity or conveying 
valuable information to investors. However, with the increase in the number of 
educated investor, such anomalies will disappear.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Stocks with bonus issues in 1995
Stock Date
1 ANACM 06-Jan-95
2 TOFAS 16-Jan-95
3 GOODY 19-Jan-95
4 CUMRA 15-Feb-95
5 SMENS 15-Mar-95
6 TRKCM 16-Mar-95
7 ARCLK 07-Apr-95
8 ANACM 17-Apr-95
9 IZMDC 15-May-95
10 IZOCM 22-May-95
11 GOODY 24-May-95
12 BRSAN 30-May-95
13 TATKS 30-May-95
14 DOKTS 12-Jun-95
15 OTOSN 14-Jun-95
16 SIFAS 23-Jun-95
17 ERCYS 28-Jun-95
18 ANBRA lO-Jul-95
19 GUNEY 12-JUİ-95
20 TOASO 24-JuI-95
21 ECILC 16-Aug-95
22 BURCE 21-Aug-95
23 MERKO 25-Aug-95
stock
24 ARCLK
25 TIRE
26 CELHA
27 EGBRA
28 DARDL
29 ASLAN
30 NTTUR
31 BROVA
32 BUCIM
33 UCAK
Date
28-Aug-95 
31-Aug-95 
20-Sep-95 
25-Sep-95 
18-Oct-95 
01-Nov-95 
06-NOV-95 
17-NOV-95 
04-Dec-95 
14-Dec-95
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Stocks with bonus issues in 1996
stock Date
1 DITAS 25-Jan-96
2 AYGAZ 29-Jan-96 
3ANACM 12-Feb-96
4 KARTN lO-Apr-96
5 ABANA 06-May-96
6 BROVA 14-May-96
7 MIGRS 16-May-96
8 ASELS 23-May-96
9 DOKTS 27-May-96
10 ERBOS 27-May-96
11 HEKTS 27-May-96
12 IZOCM 27-May-96
13 TOASO 27-May-96
14 UNYEC 27-May-96
15 ARDEM 28-May-96
16 ARCLK 29-May-96
17 OTKAR 29-May-96
18 YUNSA 29-May-96
19 MARET 30-May-96
20 NERGS 30-May-96
21 POLYL 30-May-96
22 SIPAS 30-May-96
23 ALRSA 3I-May-96
stock
24 ВЕКО
25 ECILC
26 EGEEN
27 KLBMO
28 ALCTL
29 DENCM
30 CELHA
31 MERKO
32 BRSAN
33 MILYT
34 SARKY
35 GENTS
36 MIPAZ
37 TRKCM
38 BOLUC
39 ESEMS
40 KRTEK
41 FRIGO
42 EMNIS
43 TURCS
44 AYGAZ
45 KAVOR
46 EPLAS
Date
3I-May-96 
31 -May-96 
31-May-96 
31-May-96 
03-Jun-96
05- Jun-96
06- Jun-96
07- Jun-96 
lO-Jun-96 
I O-Jun-96 
lO-Jun-96 
14-Jun-96 
I7-Jun-96
17- Jun-96
18- Jun-96 
20-Jun-96 
20-Jun-96 
OI-JuI-96
08- JuI-96 
08-Jul-96 
IO-JuI-96 
I7-JuI-96
I2-Aug-96
stock
47 MAKTK
48 TEZSN
49 BANVT
50 ECYAP
51 AKTAS
52 ANBRA
53 GUNEY
54 PIMAS
55 ERCYS
56 TOPAS
57 AFYON
58 AYCES
59 PENIS
60 EGBRA
61 ADEL
Date
16-Aug-96 
16-Aug-96
19- Aug-96
22- Aug-96 
16-Sep-96 
I6-Sep-96 
I8-Oct-96
04-Nov-96
I4-NOV-96
20- NOV-96
21- NOV-96 
25-NOV-96 
I6-Dec-96
23- Dec-96 
25-Dec-96
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Stocks with bonus issues in 1997
stock
1 KENT
2 RKSEV
3 EGPRO
4 SMENS
5 SASA
6 CELHA
7 YATAS
8 CEMTS
9 IZOCM
10 KARTN
11 ARDEM
12 GUNEY
13 MERKO
14 ASELS
15 BOSSA
16 BROVA
17 UNYEC
18 ARCLK
19 ВЕКО
20 EGPRO
21 EPLAS
22 HEKTS
23 KLBMO
24 MIGRS
Date
15-Jan-97 
20-Mar-97 
24-Mar-97 
03-Apr-97 
lO-Apr-97 
15-Apr-97 
15-Apr-97 
20-May-97
20- May-97
21- May-97 
26-May-97 
26-May-97 
26-May-97
28-May-97 
28-May-97
28- May-97
29- May-97
30- May-97 
30-May-97 
30-May-97 
30-May-97 
30-May-97 
30-May-97 
30-May-97
stock
25 NTTUR
26 TOASO
27 TUDDF
28 UKIM
29 MILYT
30 UKIM
31 ERBOS
32 BOLUC
33 ВЕКО
34 CELHA
35 KAPLM
36 HEKTS
37 OTKAR
38 TOASO
39 TURCS
40 EGPRO
41 EPLAS
42 NERGS
43 TOFAS
44 MIPAZ
45 EGGUB
46 KNFRT
47 GEDİZ
48 POLYL
Date
30-May-97
30-May-97
30-May-97
30-May-97
02-Jun-97
05-Jun-97
13- Jun-97
16- Jun-97
17- Jun-97
18- Jun-97 
18-Jun-97 
23-Jun-97 
23-Jun-97 
23-Jun-97 
23-Jun-97 
04-JUİ-97 
04-JuI-97 
07-JUİ-97
09- JUİ-97
10- Jul-97
14- JUİ-97 
25-JUİ-97 
28-JUİ-97 
30-İUİ-97
stock
49 SIFAS
50 ESEMS
51 PIMAS
52 ALRSA
53 BURCE
54 GUNEY
55 PARSN
56 IHEVA
57 KONYA
58 HZNDR
59 EGBRA
60 DUROF
61 ALCTL
62 AKTAS
63 NIGDE
64 ASUZU
65 INMDY
66 DENCM
67 TOFAS
68 DOKTS
69 TRKCM
70 CIMSA
71 BRISA
72 BRMEN
Date
30-JUİ-97
06-Aug-97
ll-Aug-97
18-Aug-97
18-Aug-97
18-Aug-97
18-Aug-97
28- Aug-97 
Ol-Sep-97 
lO-Sep-97 
15-Sep-97
22- Sep-97 
06-Oct-97 
15-Oct-97 
20-Oct-97 
06-NOV-97 
15-NOV-97 
20-NOV-97 
20-NOV-97 
03-Dec-97 
08-Dec-97
23- Dec-97
29- Dec-97 
29-Dec-97
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